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Abstract: The MARISA Horizon 2020 project improves maritime security communities’ information exchange, situational 
awareness, decision-making and reaction capabilities with a data fusion toolkit based on various heterogeneous and 
homogeneous data and information. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence collected from publicly available 
sources, including the internet, newspapers, radio, television, government reports and professional and academic literature. 
Social media intelligence (SOCMINT) can be defined as the analytical exploitation of information available on social media 
networks. It identifies social media content as an opportunity and challenge for open source investigations. This paper 
provides qualitative analysis of ethics in maritime surveillance. Ethical issues concerning OSINT, SOCMINT and big data are 
diverse and evolving. Their impact on MARISA concerns both technology, user processes and the business/governance 
model. Even though international regulatory guidelines are available, specific allowances, prohibitions and exceptions mainly 
stem from national legislation. European Data Protection Reform (EDPR) partly harmonizes the data protection regulation in 
EU countries (DPA), but still leaves the possibility for variation at the national level (DPD). One big challenge is coping with 
the mosaic effect. Data protection sets strong requirements for MARISA technology, utilizing various data sources and 
performing data fusions on various levels. Another big challenge concerns the reliance on automated analysis: How can data 
fusion algorithms which are reliable and transparent for the end user be developed? Combined with OSINT, big data is able 
to map behaviour and tendencies. However, data science is needed in OSINT because of the lack/low quality of big data, to 
find the correct answers, capture the correct data and to have the correct perception of how to proceed throughout the 
process. In the context of big data, it is also notable that current academic and public debates entertain the notion of shifting 
the emphasis from data collection to data analytics and data use. There are scholars who underline the need for “algorithmic 
accountability”. It can therefore be expected that the legal requirements concerning personal data processing and big data 
may develop in this direction. Therefore, to separate the ethics of data collection from the ethics of processing and use is 
essential. 
 
Keywords: ethics of OSINT, ethics of law enforcement, ethics of surveillance, open source intelligence, maritime 
surveillance, social media intelligence 
1. Introduction 
The ongoing MARISA Horizon 2020 project focuses on four major objectives: (1) to create improved situational 
awareness with a focus on delivering a complete and useful comprehension of the situation at sea; (2) to support 
practitioners throughout the complete lifecycle of situations at sea, from the observation of elements in the 
environment to the detection of anomalies and aids to planning; (3) to encourage fruitful collaboration between 
adjacent and cross-border agencies operating in the maritime surveillance sphere (navy, coast guard, customs, 
border police) in order to pull resources towards the same goal, leading to cost-efficient use of existing 
resources; and (4) to foster a dynamic eco-system of users and providers, allowing for new data fusion services, 
based on “distilled” knowledge, to be delivered to different actors at sea by the integration of a wide range of 
data and sensors (MARISA, 2018). Among maritime security communities, Marisa improves information 
exchange, situational awareness, decision-making and reaction capabilities with a data fusion toolkit based on 
various heterogeneous and homogeneous data and information. The toolkit fuses information and data from 
different sources into knowledge, capitalizing on the large amount of unexploited maritime data. It extends this 
information fusion to other data streams beyond maritime data, such as the open source intelligence (OSINT) 
coming from social networks and the Internet whilst leaving users fully in control of selecting whether or not to 
include such data streams (MARISA, 2018). The MARISA solution provides a mechanism to get insights from any 
big data source, perform analysis of a variety of data based on geographical and spatial presentation, use 
techniques to search for typical and new patterns that identify possible connections between events, and 
explore predictive analysis with models to represent the effect of the relationships of observed objects at sea. 
Enterprise and ad hoc reporting and services, within the CISE (European Commission, 2018) context, will be 
provided to support users and operational systems in their daily activities, as well as presentation tools for 
navigating and visualizing the results of data fusion processing. 
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Open source intelligence (OSINT) is based on publicly available information, both offline and online. Open source 
information (OSINF) has increased the range of security tools at the disposal of security. However, the side 
effects of this method of intelligence gathering should be balanced by a form of accountability. Most Western 
societies have strict legislation concerning phone tapping, but for social networking sites or apps this is less 
evident. Many security officials do not see a need for more accountability for OSINT because they see social 
media sites as a part of the public domain and so anyone is able to access it. The difference, however, between 
just anyone and a security official is that OSINT can indirectly or directly affect someone’s private life or future 
opportunities and the use of OSINF for intelligence purposes has real life consequences. From a human rights 
perceptive, these side effects should be balanced (Eijkman & Weggemans, 2012). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to assist MARISA developers, maritime surveillance decision-makers and end users, 
and also provide business models of MARISA to identify and to take into consideration legal, ethical and societal 
dimensions of the MARISA OSINT solution. The aim is to support the ethical sustainability of future MARISA 
solutions aimed at reducing harm from illegal activities and for the benefit of less human suffering and saved 
lives. This paper provides qualitative analysis of ethics and ethical issues concerning OSINT, SOCMINT and big 
data in maritime surveillance. The impact of these technologies on MARISA concern both technology, user 
processes and business/governance models. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Tables 1–6 present 
summaries of the results of qualitative analysis. Section 2 addresses the matter at hand of the ethical challenges 
in law enforcement and maritime surveillance. Section 3 focuses on open source intelligence (OSINT), social 
media intelligence (SOCMINT) and big data applied by maritime law enforcement authorities from an ethical 
perspective. Section 4 offers discussion and concludes the paper. 
2. The ethical challenges in maritime surveillance 
The ethics of law enforcement in general have been discussed extensively in academia and in various reports 
and statements, both from the philosophical viewpoint as well as from a more practical point of view, especially 
concerning privacy and its trade off with security, freedom and other related human rights. Privacy and data 
protection are of special concern when, for example, using drones and surveillance cameras, with automated 
border control, and when collecting and analysing big data. In addition, the impact of new surveillance 
technologies on the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees as well as the increased responsibility 
this more effective situational awareness brings (under international refugee law and the Search and Rescue 
regime: duty to render assistance) have all been debated by numerous scholars, see e.g. (Meijers Committee, 
2012). 
 
Many of the ethical/societal challenges and opportunities of MARISA are those of maritime surveillance in 
general and discussed above. However, MARISA’s capacities for maritime surveillance, and especially border 
control, emphasizes the importance of taking these challenges and opportunities more seriously. The biggest 
ethical challenge concerns the use of MARISA in border control. This is related to the tensions between 
humanitarianism and security, and the human rights of both EU citizens and migrants. Furthermore, it is a 
challenge that may have various unwanted consequences, such as the balloon effect, or even tensions in 
international relationships. 
 
At its meeting in June 2014, the European Council agreed on five priority areas to guide the EU's work over the 
next five years. This strategic agenda will be used to plan the work of the European Council and also acts as a 
basis for the work programs of other EU institutions. From the viewpoint of MARISA and maritime surveillance, 
two priority areas are of particular relevance, namely, “Freedom, Security and Justice” and “The EU as a strong 
global actor” (see Table 1). The first is relevant when talking about the ethics and societal sustainability of 
MARISA in a European context (e.g. border control and migration). The latter, especially pertinent since MARISA 
also aims for businesses outside the EU, and thus “The EU as strong global actor” asks for solid societal 
consideration of MARISA and its impacts on societies.  
 
In order to resolve the question presented above, i.e. the tension between humanitarianism and security, and 
the human rights, and, in addition, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights can be used as tool in MARISA since 
it brings together, in a single document, the protection of fundamental rights protected in the EU. The Charter 
can also be used as an important tool in value creation since when MARISA solutions are aligned with ethical 
requirements, their value is on a solid foundation. The Charter was established in 2000 and became legally 
binding on EU Member States when it was ratified at the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. According to the 
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Societal Impact Expert Working Group Report (SIEWG, 2012), these f u n d a m e n t a l  rights should be a 
necessary requirement that could and should lead to drawing boundaries on what is and what is not 
acceptable in EC-funded security research initiatives. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is consistent with 
the European Convention on Human Rights adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe; when the 
Charter contains rights that stem from this convention, their meaning and scope are the same. 
Table 1: EC priority areas and MARISA surveillance 
Priority area Contents Maritime Surveillance Aspects 
Freedom, security 
and justice 
 
 
 
“The European 
Council 
emphasises the 
importance of 
good EU 
cooperation on 
security issues like 
terrorism and 
managing 
migration flows.” 
better management of all 
aspects of migration, 
including irregular 
migration, asylum and 
border management 
 
preventing and combating 
organised crime, corruption 
and terrorism 
improving judicial 
cooperation between EU 
countries 
Privacy is strongly associated with freedom, and a society where 
every movement and action is recorded is considered contrary to 
this idea of freedom. In the context of maritime surveillance, it is 
important to protect the principle of “freedom of navigation”. 
 
Increased control and security measures are justified with the need 
to protect Europe against cross-border crime, such as illegal 
trafficking and smuggling. The European maritime border is, 
however, not only a security issue for the EU but also for those 
seeking to enter Europe by sea. 
 
Protecting Europe’s seas and borders should be aimed at both 
creating a secure maritime environment but also protecting the 
lives and physical and moral integrity of those who travel at sea. 
 
EU as a strong 
global actor 
 
 
 
“The European 
Council calls on 
the EU to ensure 
its strong 
engagement in 
world affairs.” 
ensuring consistency 
between Member States' 
and the EU’s foreign policy 
goals 
 
promoting stability, 
prosperity and democracy 
in the countries closest to 
the EU 
 
engaging global partners 
on a wide range of issues 
such as trade, cyber 
security, human rights and 
crisis management” 
In the context of maritime surveillance, the lack of accountability 
and clear lines of responsibility between EU Member States and 
their different actors is a persistent problem. 
 
Furthermore, the diverging interpretations of rules of international 
law hinder the cooperation between Member States in maritime 
surveillance. 
 
 
 
Maritime surveillance is based on coordination and information 
sharing between Member States. Therefore, it has the potential to 
create a mutual control mechanism between the participating 
agents, with regard to both fundamental human rights and refugee 
law and rescue obligations. 
3. Ethical framework for OSINT, SOCMINT and big data in maritime surveillance 
In this section, we will investigate OSINT, SOCMINT and big data from the ethical and legal perspectives. 
Achievements in the earlier projects VIRTUOSO and MEDI@4SEC are discussed here. VIRTUOSO 
(Koops;Cuijpers;& Schellekens, 2011) and MEDI@4SEC (Hadjimatheou & Roosendaal, 2016) offer practical tools 
and frameworks to be adapted with minor updates in the MARISA context, namely privacy enhancing 
technologies (PET), a legal and ethical framework for OSINT, and ethical and legal challenges for SOCMINT. 
3.1 OSINT 
OSINT is intelligence collected from publicly available sources, including the internet, newspapers, radio, 
television, government reports and professional and academic literature (Glassman & Kang, 2012). OSINT binds 
through a systematic analysis process as a tight and informative thematic entity, the scattered information to 
be obtained from open sources. During the last few years, the internet and especially social media channels have 
revolutionized the ones that had significantly increased the amount of OSINT and information to be analysed.  
 
OSINT has also been called ethical hacking, in other words, hacking that does not break the law and it is used for 
good from psychological or physical manipulation for getting information. OSINT requires knowledge of the 
network environment with a good performer, a comprehensive means selection and problem-solving skills. 
Ethical questions apply to the handling of the collected information. When collecting data from people, one 
must remember that the creation of person registers is strictly regulated. 
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On the market there are numerous efficient network analysis tools, some of which are also used by the LEAs. 
Wells and Gibson have studied OSINT from a UK perspective and considered the law enforcement and military 
domains. Their conclusion was that the UK police and military open source investigations have a great number 
of similarities. However, there are several observable differences: (1) the handling of a chain of evidence; police 
forces prioritise and integrate a chain of custody for any intelligence that may lead to prosecution in a court of 
law and therefore the police tend to have a more structured and detailed approach to evidence gathering; (2) 
the use of third party software and developers; the military prioritises the use of bespoke software tools and in-
house training solutions, where the police have rationally used a variety of commercial and private sector 
solutions, some of which are specifically designed for police OSIN; and (3) the approach towards the dark web; 
the military has a far more cautious approach to operating on the dark web, whereas the police have faced both 
pressure and a necessity to operate in this domain due to policing-specific concerns, such as online child sexual 
exploitation (Wells & Gibson, 2017). 
 
The International and EU regulation of OSINT includes the regulations and conventions named in Table 2 (right 
column). However, even though international regulatory guidelines are available, specific allowances, 
prohibitions and exceptions mainly stem from national legislation (Koops, 2013; Koops, Hoepman & Leenes, 
2013). The European Data Protection Reform partly harmonizes the general data protection regulation in EU 
countries (General Data Protection Regulation), but in the case of law enforcement and crime prevention it still 
offers variation in the national level legislation (Data Protection Directive). 
 
Hu (2016) identifies five key concerns relating to OSINT that are gathered in Table 2 (left column) together with 
corresponding regulation (right column). The first question in relation to open sources is the following: How 
trustworthy are they? Also, the line between espionage and OSINT can be very thin, therefore caution and 
double-checking are advised before conducting OSINT activities (Hribar, Podbregar & Ivanusa, 2014). 
Table 2: Summary of legal and ethical framework for OSINT 
Key concerns about OSINT International and EU regulation of OSINT 
Origin and intent of sources 
Unclassified but sensitive 
Mosaic effect 
Reliance on automated analysis 
Publicity and visibility 
European Fundamental Rights 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Cybercrime Convention 
EU Data Protection Regulation 
IPR legislation 
Liability 
Regulation of investigative agencies 
The main ethical challenges for OSINT in MARISA are similar to the challenges identified in the VIRTUOSO project, 
excluding data protection which is just changing. Therefore, we propose that MARISA applies the 
recommendations provided by the VIRTUOSO project concerning intellectual property rights and safeguards 
with end use (see Table 3). 
3.2 SOCMINT  
SOCMINT can be defined as the analytical exploitation of information available on social media networks. It 
identifies social media content as an opportunity and challenge for open source investigations (Trottier, 2015). 
According to some scholars, the surveillance of social media should be removed from the definition and 
discussion about OSINT and treated as an issue in its own right (Wood, 2016). 
 
The concerns that Hu (2016) identifies relating to OSINT are also relevant to SOCMINT. However, the ability to 
monitor millions of social media accounts and hashtags in real time, and to then analyse and store this data, is 
a concern unique to social media. According to Wood (2016), we need to challenge the argument that SOCMINT 
is an inexpensive strategy with little impact on people’s privacy because it relies only on so-called publicly 
available (i.e. non-private) information. Social media does not easily fit into either the category of public or 
private. We would argue that it is instead a pseudo-private space where there is an expectation of privacy from 
the state (Wood, 2016). The grey zone is a space of transition where legitimate and legal methods pass into 
illegitimate and illegal methods, but are neither specifically allowed nor specifically forbidden; and the ethics 
and morality of these methods are questionable (Podbregar, 2016). 
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The MEDI@4SEC (Hadjimatheou & Roosendaal, 2016) project identifies legal and ethical issues concerning 
SOCMINT both from the viewpoint of the police use of social media and from the viewpoint of the involvement 
of citizens in the provision of public security. These viewpoints are summarized in Table 4. When it comes to the 
use of SOCMINT, a framework for the analysis of social media use (Table 5) developed in the MEDI@4SEC project 
seems to be suitable for MARISA, at least in the early stage of the project. 
Table 3: OSINT recommendations by VIRTUOSO 
OSINT recommendations 
 
1. Deploy complete transparency about VIRTUOSO on its publicly accessible website, including substantiation of the 
need, purpose, proportionality, and subsidiarity of the project, and about its efforts to apply privacy/security by design. 
2. Make a clear division between the tasks and responsibilities of the platform developer and provider with respect to 
content, and those of application providers and end users. 
3. Specify the purpose(s) of the prototype. 
4. Determine who is the data controller within the project and notify the relevant Data Protection Authority. 
5. Substantiate why prototype testing requires real-life data. If using real-life data is necessary, personal data should be 
anonymised or irreversibly pseudonymised as soon as they are recognised as personal data. Personal data that cannot 
be anonymised (e.g. photographs and indirectly identifying personal characteristics) should be stored only for as long as 
is strictly necessary for testing the prototype. 
6. Limit the processing of photos and video in view of the prohibition to process sensitive data. 
7. Respect stipulations of access restrictions in robots.txt files or in meta-information of websites. 
8. Be aware of national differences in copyright exemptions and the application of implicit licenses; activities can best 
take place in countries with a copyright and database-right regime that is most favourable for the project in these 
respects. 
9. Conduct a risk analysis to determine which level of liability is acceptable for data protection infringements (e.g. for 
processing sensitive data) and for IPR infringements in light of uncertainties about, for example, the existence of implicit 
licenses and the applicable law with respect to statutory exceptions. 
10. Apply privacy/security by design by restricting the functionalities of the end product(s) as much as possible (i.e. 
make them minimally invasive of human rights and intellectual property rights) while ensuring they can serve their 
intended purpose of open source intelligence by public authorities for public security. 
Table 4: Ethical and legal challenges of SOCMINT 
Police uses of social media Citizens as providers of public security (DIY policing) 
Legal issues 
1)The double role of public security agents enforces of the law, 
data controllers) 
2)Fundamental rights of citizens 
3)Involvement of citizens in the provision of public security 
 
Ethical issues 
1)Disproportionate interference with the privacy of innocent 
individuals or groups 
2)Risk of outright discrimination 
3)Unfair access of some vulnerable or disadvantaged groups to 
criminal justice of public security 
4)Police officers rights to a private life and to freedom of 
expression 
Difficulty in ensuring transparency, accountability 
and non-discrimination. Citizens are driven by their 
own interpretations of the law and morality without 
democratically legitimized authority. 
 
 
 
Key challenges (concerning especially the dark web): 
-How to distinguish between illegal and merely 
offensive or otherwise unethical behaviour 
-How to determine the line between justified covert 
interactions with criminals and unjustified 
entrapment 
Table 5: Ethical criteria for SOCMINT 
Ethical criteria for SOCMINT 
1. Risks of disproportionate interference with the privacy of innocent individuals. 
2. Risks of outright discrimination or unwarranted stigmatization of individuals or groups as criminally 
suspicious as well as risks of discrimination. 
3. Unfair (because less easy or reliable) access of some vulnerable or disadvantaged groups to criminal 
justice or public security resulting from their relative lack of technology and/or technological skills. 
4. The rights of police officers to a private life and to freedom of expression on social media. 
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3.3 Big data  
Considering the potentially huge amount of data to store in the MARISA concept, it is proposed to adopt an 
original “big data” approach. Wikipedia defines “big data” as a “collection of datasets so large and complex that 
it becomes difficult to process using on-hand database management tools”. In practice, “big data” regroups a 
set of techniques/tools suitable for this storing and processing such datasets with, usually, a “NoSQL” approach. 
  
Capabilities to gather, analyse, disseminate, and preserve vast quantities of data raise concerns about the nature 
of privacy and the means by which individual privacy might be compromised or protected. Anonymity overlaps 
with privacy, but the two are not identical. Likewise, the ability to make intimate personal decisions without 
government interference is considered to be a privacy right, as is protection from discrimination on the basis of 
certain personal characteristics (such as race, gender or genome). Privacy is not just about secrets. 
 
Data collection: Individuals constantly release into the MARISA environment information whose use or misuse 
may be a source of privacy concerns. Physically, these information emanations are of two types and can be called 
“born-digital” and “born-analog.” Born-digital information is created by the individuals themselves or by a 
computer surrogate, specifically for use by a computer or data processing system. When data are born digital, 
privacy concerns can arise from over-collection. Over-collection occurs when a program’s design intentionally, 
and sometimes clandestinely, collects information unrelated to its stated purpose. Over-collection can, in 
principle, be recognized at the time of collection. Born-analog information arises from the characteristics of the 
physical world. Such information becomes accessible electronically when it impinges on a sensor such as a 
camera, microphone or other engineered device. When data are born-analog, they are likely to contain more 
information than the minimum necessary for their immediate purpose, and for valid reasons. One reason is for 
robustness of the desired “signal” in the presence of variable “noise” (Executive Office of the President 2014a). 
In addition, the MARISA concept itself creates metadata, e.g. interconnection between the developed services 
develops meta-data from all data to be transmitted. Metadata are ancillary data that describe properties of the 
data such as the time the data were created, the device on which they were created or the destination of a 
message. Included in the data or metadata may be identifying information of many kinds. It cannot today 
generally be asserted that metadata raise fewer privacy concerns than data (Executive Office of the President 
2014a). 
 
Data analytics: After data are collected, data analysis techniques (termed “analytics”) come into play and may 
generate an increasing fraction of ethical and privacy issues. By analytics, nonobvious and sometimes private 
information can be derived from data that, at the time of their collection, seemed to raise no, or only 
manageable, privacy issues. Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought into contact and 
new facts emerge. Individually, each data source may have a specific and limited purpose, but their combination 
may uncover new meanings. Such new information, used appropriately, may often bring benefits to individuals 
and society. However, the wide variety of potential uses for big data analytics raises crucial questions about 
whether our legal, ethical, and social norms are sufficient to protect privacy and other values in a big data world 
(US Executive Office of the President, 2014a). The “brain” of MARISA is enhanced data fusion and analysis to 
improve maritime surveillance as well as search and rescue with respect to response time and situational 
awareness. Due to data fusion in MARISA, privacy concerns may not necessarily be recognizable in born-digital 
data when they are collected. Due to signal processing robustness and standardization, the same is true of born-
analog data—even data from a single source (e.g. a single camera). When born-digital and born-analog data are 
combined with data fusion, new kinds of data are generated from data analytics. 
 
Use of data: Data analysis does not directly touch the individual (it is neither collection nor, without additional 
action, use) and may have no external visibility. By contrast, it is the use of data (including born-digital or born-
analog data and the products of data fusion and analysis) that can cause adverse consequences for individuals. 
Violations of privacy are possible even when there is no failure in computer security. If an authorized individual 
chooses to misuse data, what is violated is privacy policy, not security policy. Or, as we have discussed, privacy 
may be violated by the fusion of data—even if performed by authorized individuals on secure computer systems 
(US Executive Office of the President, 2014b) 
 
Infrastructure behind data: Data analytics requires not just algorithms and data but also physical platforms 
where the data are stored and analysed. The related security services used for personal data are also an essential 
component of the infrastructure. Good cybersecurity enforces policies that are precise and unambiguous. On 
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the other hand, compromised cybersecurity is clearly a threat to privacy. Privacy can be breached by failure to 
enforce confidentiality of data, by failure of identity and authentication processes or by more complex scenarios 
such as those compromising availability (US Executive Office of the President, 2014a). 
 
An ethical issue in the big data context is data protection and privacy. Regulation of data protection and privacy 
is founded on fundamental rights that are enshrined in treaties such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in EU.  
 
Another ethical issue comes with automated policing. Automated discrimination is possible when augmented 
surveillance becomes more common. It intersects with the technical issues of unintended biases in algorithms 
and big data that could skew analyses generated by artificial intelligence (AI) systems (Rahman, 2017). 
Algorithms tell computers step by step how to solve a certain problem. According to Rahman (2017), the first 
problem comes from algorithmic bias—AI algorithms being a reflection of the programmers’ biases—may 
possibly give rise to the risk of false alerts by AI surveillance systems thus resulting in wrongful profiling and 
arrest; and the second problem is that AI profiling systems utilise historical data to generate lists of suspects for 
the purposes of predicting or solving crimes. AI systems are only as good as the data sets that the systems trained 
and worked with (Rahman, 2017). 
 
A framework for the big data proposed by Broeders, et al. (2017) seems to be suitable in turn for the purposes 
of MARISA both on the level of technology, user processes and business model (see Table 6). It emphasises the 
phases of analysis (and use) of big data. The important choices are made in the phase of the analysis: selecting 
the algorithms, data sources and categorisation, assigning weight to various data, etc. In the current legal 
framework, the analysis phase has remained relatively unregulated and algorithmic accountability is largely 
lacking. Therefore, quality criteria should be made more explicit to increase organisational awareness and to 
create more accountability; a legal and explicit duty of care should be introduced for government organisations 
using big data analysis in the domain of security. Furthermore, when it comes to the use of big data, the real life 
consequences merits very thorough scrutiny of how big data analyses contribute to decision-making processes 
and their practical use. (Broeders et al, 2017). 
Table 6: Framework for big data (Broeders et al, 2017) 
Regulation in the analysis phase 
A legal and explicit duty of care 
External reviews and audits 
Sunset clauses and Surveillance Impact Assessment (SIA) (>PIA) 
Regulation for the use of the data 
Bounding profiles 
No (semi)-automatic decision making 
Own the data, own the consequences 
Reinforcing oversight 
Increasing layered transparency 
Increasing possibilities for judicial review 
4. Discussion 
Ethical issues concerning OSINT, SOCMINT and big data are diverse and evolving. Their impact on MARISA 
concern both technology, user processes and the business/governance model. Even though international 
regulatory guidelines are available, specific allowances, prohibitions and exceptions mainly stem from national 
legislation. European Data Protection Reform (EDPR) partly harmonizes data protection regulation in EU 
countries (DPA), but still leaves the possibility for variation on the national level (DPD). 
 
One big challenge is coping with the mosaic effect. Data protection sets strong requirements on MARISA 
technology utilizing various data sources and performing data fusions on various levels. Another big challenge 
concerns the reliance of automated analysis: How can data fusion algorithms that are reliable and transparent 
for the end-user be developed? As dos Passos (2016) argues, associated with OSINT, big data is about being able 
to map behaviour and tendencies. However, data science is needed in OSINT because of the lack/low quality of 
big data, to find the correct answers, capture the correct data and to have the correct perception of how to 
proceed throughout the process.  
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In the context of big data, it is also notable that current academic and public debates entertain the notion of 
shifting the emphasis from data collection to data analytics and data use. There are scholars who underline the 
need for "algorithmic accountability” (Broeders et al, 2017). It can therefore be expected that the legal 
requirements concerning personal data processing and big data may develop in this direction. Therefore, to 
separate the ethics of data collection from the ethics of the processing and use of data is essential. 
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